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THE CENTRAL AMERICAN AND 
SPANISH CARIBBEAN SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE: 
A NEW FOCUS FOR U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
Development stragtegies have seldom addressed the justice 
systems, and discussions of their problems are notably absent 
from national and regional reports. The Kissinger Commission on 
Central America, however, found the situation of the judiciary 
sufficiently critical to development strategy that 
recommendations for assistance were included within their 
proposals. 
The Commissionls report noted that "in the absence of strong 
legal institutions, political, security and economic crises are 
magnified," citing El Salvador, where the "virtual collapse of 
the national criminal justice system" has occurred. While no 
other country now approaches the crisis level there, the systems 
of most of the other Central American and Caribbean republics 
present such significant administrative problems and low levels 
of public confidence that the preconditions for institutional 
crisis and collapse are present. 
The Commission specifically recommended that the United 
States help strengthen Central American judicial systems to: 
"- Enhance the training and resources of judges, judicial 
staff, and public prosecutors' off ices. 
- Support modern and professional means of criminal 
investigation. 
- Promote availability of legal materials, assistance to 
law faculties, and support for local bar associations." (Report 
at p. 74) 
Judicial systems throughout the region operate under 
physical, financial and personnel conditions which range from 
severely inadequate to virtually neglected. It is difficult to 
truly represent the crisis which these systems currently face. 
The most fundamental problem is lack of fixed judicial tenure in 
office and very low salaries for judges, prosecutors, and other 
court officials. The endemic unavailability of basic legal 
materials to judges, prosecutors, and defenders in the region 
affects all aspects of the administration of justice. Extensive 
legislative and case reporting systems, as we know them, are non- 
existent in these countries. Typically, courts, judges, and 
prosecutors have no law libraries, and often operate from 
outdated versions of basic legal codes. Trial judges have 
virtually no access to the collected jurisprudence or recent 
decisions of higher courts for guidance, usually because such 
essential research tools do not exist or are hopelessly outdated. 
The result is that untrained and untenured judges often decide 
cases on the basis of incorrect legal principles, after delays 
counted in years. These poor conditions are the norm in national 
capitals and are magnified in the provinces. In turn, the 
confidence in the court system among lawyers and ordinary 
citizens is lessened. If the United States wishes to strengthen 
democracy here, urgent attention must be devoted to the 
fortification of this basic underpinning of any permanent 
democratic system. 
Description s f  Judicial Sratem and Its Problems 
--- 
Qusnizati~n ~f Ganrta 
The constitutions of Central American countries all provide 
for an independent judicial branch with a pyramidal 
organizational structure. Normally there is a supreme court, an 
intermediate court of appeals, a trial court of first recourse 
for serious cases, and an inferior court of limited jurisdiction, 
akin to justices of the peace, for resolution of minor disputes. 
These constitutions have been especial ly in£ luenced by that of 
the United States and contain exemplary guarantees for the 
autonomy of the courts and the safety of individual rights. 
However, in most of the countries, the presence of a strong 
executive has made true judicial independence a rarity. In all 
countries of the region, the judicial branch is constitutionally 
independent, but except for Costa Rica, the judiciary lacks such 
autonomy in practice. It is usually the worst organized, poorest 
equipped, and most underfunded branch of government. 
The & fact0 judicial branch subservience to the executive 
has been especially pronounced in the Dominican Republic, where 
the courtshaveno control overtheir ownbudget or its 
administration. The Dominican judiciary is charged by law with 
administration of its own budget yet, in practice, the 
Procurator General, an arm of the executive, acts as the 
management agency with the sole discretion to authorize 
expenditure of appropriated funds, hiring of judicial employees, 
payment of salaries, purchasing, maintenance of courts, etc. 
This administrative dependency upon the executive branch 
effectively blocks the development of an independent judiciary. 
In addition to traditional legal roles, supreme courts also 
play a critical management role since they are the supreme 
administrative body for the judiciary, exercising almost total 
disciplinary power over all lower tribunals and their members. 
Depending on the administrative scheme, they may also 
supervise a number of diverse functions, some of which would not 
be considered "judicial" in nature in the United States: 1) 
supervision of the judicial police (presently extant in Costa 
Rica only); 2) administration of judicial lay staffs, which in 
some cases may be quite numerous; 3) management of budgets for 
the entire national judiciary; 4) selection of lower court 
judges, often without any voice from the other branches of 
government; 5) promulgation of procedural rules for the 
administration of courts; and, 6) management of statistical 
collection of the court system. 
While some supreme courts attempt to exert their 
disciplinary powers over lower court judges, they seldom possess 
the resources or skill to correctly supervise judicial 
discipline. This supervisory role should not be limited solely 
to disciplinary matter, but should also extend to evaluation of 
the factors which contribute to defects, such as delay, and 
provide solutions to these problems. 
Though most members of the judiciary are legal 
professionals, in terms of their university degree, most judges 
from the supreme court to the lowest levels are totally 
unprepared to carry out the administrative functions assigned to 
them. As in the United States, these duties are delegated 
primarily to subordinates who are often lawyers themselves, and 
suffer the same lack of administrative training and interest. 
~ The U.S. judiciary, both federal and state, has recognized this 
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problem and instituted reforms designed to develop a professional 
administrative cadre. However, in Central America, counterparts 
to court administrators or clerks of the court are virtually 
unknown. Thus, in most cases, judges do not exercise their 
administrative responsibilities efficiently. This is due to a 
lack of human and financial resources, administrative experience, 
and/or the perception that administrative matters are not part of 
the judicial function. 
This administrative disorganization is reflected at all 
procedural stages. In virtually every court, including some of 
the supreme courts, the filing systems range from unorganized to 
chaotic. There may be no filing folders, cabinets, typewriters, 
photocopiers or file retrieval systems. In some cases, files are 
simply piled on the floor. A constant source of case processing 
delay is the loss or disappearance of files. 
While one may conclude that administrative duties are 
secondary to legal roles, and thus caseloads prevent the adequate 
development of supervisory duties, the legal output of many 
supreme courts is not extensive. In El Salvador, for example, 
the supreme court only reviews forty to fifty cassation appeals 
per year. This low figure may be accounted for in part by the 
explanation that few cases ever reach the supreme court due to 
the high number of prisoners awaiting trial, delays in the 
process, and the huge criminal and civil backlogs. 
Judicial Selection 
In all of the countries, all of the courts above the lowest 
levels require legal professionals to act as judges. However, in 
many countries, the lowest level judge frequently is neither a 
lawyer nor even a university graduate and, in many instances, may 
lack even a completed secondary education. Especially in rural 
areas, this is the judge (juez de paz or de municipio) who 
handles most disputes and complaints. Yet he is the least 
educated, lowest paid and most neglected in the system, despite 
power to punish minor crimes, hear minor civil cases, and settle 
disputes by mediation. He also has the sole discretion to jail 
or release criminal suspects, and investigate major crimes for 
forwarding to the next level trial court. 
Judges are selected in several ways in the Central American 
countries: 1) selection by the executive with the approval of the 
legislative branch; 2) selection by the legislative branch; 3) 
selection of supreme court by legislature with supreme court, in 
turn, naming lower court judges. In Honduras, the lower court 
judges name the justices of the peace. While in most of the 
countries, judges are prevented from other employment, this is 
not the case inEl Salvador where theymay act as notaries even 
while exercising judicial authority. 
In every Central American country except Costa Rica, the 
absence of civil service security contributes to judicial 
instability and political interference for a1 1 judicial 
personnel. The most extreme cases of such interference are 
Honduras and the Dominican Republic since judicial terms end with 
those of the legislative and executive branches, resulting in 
massive personnel changes upon the election of an opposition 
party. Without tenure in office, a given judgeship may be held 
by a succession of appointees within the same presidential term. 
Traininq gf Justice Personnel 
Training of judges is verylimitedinthe region. The only 
formal judicial school is operated by the Costa Rican judiciary, 
but serves mainly as a training mechanism for administrative 
support personnel, providing legal education for judges in few 
instances. All of the other countries have expressed a desire to 
form judicial schools which would provide training for judges, 
prosecutors and public defenders as well as administrative 
personnel. Financial and other constraints have delayed 
implementation of such training programs. Honduras, for example, 
possesses the enacting legislation, but the supreme court has not 
promulgated the administrative regulations for establishment of 
such a training vehicle. 
Training of other judicial support personnel has fallen to 
the judicial branch, since in most of the countries civil service 
protection for judicial employees has never been established. 
Panama had a career judiciary, but its system was abandoned in 
1969 when President Torrijos abolished the courts. This lack of 
a judicial career has meant a lack of minimum hiring criteria, 
lack of job security, lack of a system for promotions or 
guaranteeing wage levels, and has compelled the judiciary to 
devote what little training resources it possesses to the 
training of inferior personnel. 
While law faculties might provide practical preparation for 
a judicial career, regional legal education is tradition-bound, 
and short on practical training of any sort. Universities have 
also been seriously affected by the economic crisis. While some 
law faculties are interested in establishing special course 
concentrations for judicial training, nothing has developed thus 
far. Virtually all law schools continue to rely on part-time 
faculty and the deanship is often viewed as reserved for those 
who canafford to take aleaveof absence fromtheir private 
practices. Library facilities have been curtailed and many of 
the law libraries are seriously deficient in maintaining even 
minimal collections. 
Lnck ofl Data 
A problem common to all the countries is lack of reliable 
data onwhich topla nor evaluate the system. Costa Rica has 
developed a fairly sophisticated statistical system in recent 
years, but it is stillmaintainedbyhand and does not provide 
immediate information. The other countries are much farther 
behind, and it is impossible to plan for any reforms without 
including this important subsector. 
Another area which is commonly deficient is the maintenance 
of criminal history data. This is sometimes kept and 
administered by the courts, but in most countries it is 
maintained by the police. This information is critical in 
making sentencing decisions and a further point of procedural 
blockage in those cases in which an inefficient system produces 
delays, errors and the potential for corruption. 
Judicial Autonomy 
Apart from Costa Rica, no strong independent judiciary 
exists in the region. The strength of Costa Rica's judiciary is 
largely due to three factors: first, there is a historical 
tradition of independence and popular support for such a notion; 
secondly, supreme court judges are appointed to seven-year terms 
and may be reappointed: and, thirdly, their budget is guaranteed 
by the Constitution at 6% of the national budget. In order to 
maintain their independence, they have always formally requested 
the full amount, even though they may later return some portion 
to the national treasury. 
While the constitutions of some other countries also provide 
a mandatory fixed percentage for the judiciary, it is rarely 
obtained in practice, Honduras, for example, provides for 3% of 
the national budget to be allocated to the judiciary, but the 
supreme court has never requested nor received the amount it is 
entitled to by law. Panama's judiciary has a 2% guarantee, under 
the new 1984 Constitution, and did receive a substantial 
budgetary increase--but not the allotted 2%. 
Panama's new constitution also provided for ten-year terms 
for supreme court judges, with staggered appointments to assure 
continuity, an important step toward judicial independence. 
There is clearly a recognition through the region of the need to 
make judicial independence real. Some important steps have been 
taken, but a strong political will and a shared perception of the 
fundamental importance of independent judiciaries to true 
democracies are fragile commodities. 
Procedure 
The general design of a civil law system also provides 
judges with some functions unknown in the common law countries, 
Trials are divided into two phases: an instructional stage and a 
trial stage. The first involves all those actions which are 
taken in preparation of the charges against the defendant, and is 
carried out by an instructional magistrate, or a public 
prosecutor. 
Once a report of a crime is made, the instructional judge 
assumes control over the investigation of the offense. He 
determines the nature of the crime, supervises the questioning of 
witnesses, inspects the scene of the crime, appoints experts and 
identifies suspects, The potential defendant is then called to 
testify before this magistrate who takes a statement and enters 
it into the record. If an arrest is necessary, only this 
magistrate is empowered to order it. Once the suspect is in 
custody, the magistrate determines whether to release this 
defendant or to hold him in custody. All matters reviewed during 
this stage are set down in writing and placedina file, which 
eventually embodies the case against the defendant. Upon 
completion of the investigatory stage, the instructional 
magistrate will forward the complete file to the prosecutor for 
review and thereupon the criminal action will be instituted on 
the basis of a filing document. 
While the foregoing generally describes the instructional 
phase, each country in the region has assigned that function 
differently, The Dominican Republic has judges of instruction. 
Honduras, Panama and Costa Rica do not, having either merged that 
function with the trial judge or assigned it to the prosecutor. 
But regardless of which functionary has the task, the near total 
lack of investigatory resources and personnel makes effective 
investigation extremely difficult and often impossible. In most 
instances, the national police, often a part of the military, are 
the only investigative forces available. The police may or may 
not cooperate with the investigating judge. In most instances, 
very little professional investigative skill is available, and 
the suspect's confession is the primary evidence. 
In order to insure an objective trial, the evidence gathered 
by the investigating magistrate is referred to the appropriate 
trial court. This material is admissible at the trial but may be 
rebutted by the defendant. 
Generally, the trial is not the public adversative 
proceeding as known in the United States. While in three of the 
countries, limited oral hearings are provided during some trials, 
at least for serious crimes, most trials are closed 
administrative processes. Honduras and El Salvador follow an 
exclusively written system in which criminal cases become 
"documentary contests--with each case being narrowed to sewn 
volumes in which the court is totally isolated from the accused 
and his background, and in which the judicial function is 
delegated to employees and minor functionaries (if not in the 
police)..." (Zaffaroni, 1982: 79). This feature, derived from 
the old inquisitorial system, still predominates in these 
countries. 
Another feature common to these countries is the ability of 
the judiciary to proceed against absent defendants, and for the 
I accused to be questioned before the judge without the presence of 
his defense attorney. 
Delay amJ Preventive Detention 
Theneed for personal action ofthe judge in so many 
procedural stages, together with the paperwork required in this 
system produces one of the most serious problems of Central 
American justice: delay in the processing of judicial matters. 
The procedural delay, combined with a preference for 
preventive detention, results in an inordinate percentage of the 
jail population being held in prison prior to trial, In a major 
study of all Latin American and Caribbean nations for which 
figures were available, Carranza, et al, found that the 
percentage of inmates awaiting trial ranges from 2.18% in Cayman 
to 94.25% in Paraguay, with a total average of 67.28% for the 
eighteen countries studied (Carranza, et al, 1983). 
The following features reveal the latest figures on the 
amount of prisoners being detained prior to trial: 
TABLE 1 
Country Year Total Percentage 
Number of Not 
Prisoners Sentenced 
Costa Rica 1981 
Dominican Republic 1982 
El Salvador 1981 
Honduras 1981 
Panama 1981 
Source: Elias Carranza, Mario Houed, Luis Paulino Mora, Eugenio 
Raul Zaffaroni (1983), Preso sin Condena ey! Amgrica 
y Caribe. San Jose, Costa Rica: United 
Nations: 22. 
Generally the Latin American systems make excessive use of 
preventive detention, and after trial, harsh sentences are the 
norm with prison and fines being the two most prevalent forms of 
punishment, In some instances, the code presumes the 
dangerousness of all detainees with prior criminal records, 
disallowing any judicial review of circumstances (El Salvador). 
In others, even if the codes allow such pretrial release, it is 
seldom applied by the judiciary who seem to prefer routine denial 
to pretrial review. 
Prosecutors (Ministerio Public01 
The Public Ministry is a civil law institution common to 
all of the countries. The term describes a function rather than 
an institution. Its main task is to assure compliance with all 
laws as the prosecutorial branch of government. As such, its 
duty is both to protect society from law violators as well as to 
guarantee that the citizen is protected from governmental abuse. 
The public ministry is exercised by law-trained persons 
(usuallycalled a "fiscaln) who maybeapart ofthe judicial or 
executive branch, or both. In the Dominican Republic, the 
fiscales (prosecutors) are an arm of the executive, 
administratively and politically dominant, and have more 
effective control over the criminal process than the judges , who 
operate almost exclusively without administrative staffs. In 
Honduras, the reverse appears to be true. There, the public 
ministry is exercised by two sets of fiscales, one within the 
judicial, and one within the executive branch. However, those 
under the judicial branch have the only day-to-day role in the 
criminal courts, and even this is much reduced. The Honduran 
judiciary's fiscal is basically a woefully underpaid 
administrative assistant to the judge, Who shuffles paper and 
rubber-stamps judicial decisions. The fiscales attached to the 
executive perform almost exclusively as the defenders of the 
government in civil cases. Many fiscales are law students, 
working part-time. Thus in Honduras, though the judiciary is 
weak and inefficient, the judge still dominates criminal 
proceedings and due to the debility of the public ministry there 
appears to be less prosecutor-judicial conflict than in other 
countries. 
In Panama, another variant appears. The public ministry's 
prosecution function is actively exercised by fiscales assigned 
to each court by the Procurator General. This official is the 
rough equivalent of the Attorney General of the U.S. A unique 
feature of Panama's system is the elimination (since 1941) of the 
judge of instruction (investigating magistrate), and the 
assignment of those investigating functions to the fiscales, 
rather than merging the function with those duties of the first 
level trial judge. Thus, Panamanian fiscales exercise both the 
investigative and prosecutorial functions, making them the 
strongest in the region both legally and functionally. This is 
the closest to the U.S. system where both activities are the 
responsibility of the prosecuting attorney. 
Costa Rica, as might be expected, incorporates the public 
ministry under its uniquely dominant and well-financed judiciary. 
However, even here there are problems of conflicting functions 
and unclear lines of supervision. There is no law describing and 
limiting the functions of the Costa Rican public ministry or 
fixing its position within the judicial branch hierarchy. Costa 
Rica has recognized this problem and is currently working on 
reform proposals. 
Generally, throughout the region the prosecutorial function 
of the public ministry has been emphasized over its duty as 
guarantor of individual legal rights. Its resources are 
seriously lacking for either function, particularly in the 
Dominican Republic and Honduras, and it is unlikely that it will 
prioritize the latter function when it cannot perform its 
prosecutorial role adequately. 
Public Defenders -- -- ------- 
While this function exists in the region, it is virtually 
undeveloped, (Costa Rica is again the notable exception.) A 
1980 Honduras law providing for a free public defender system has 
never been implemented, Panama has five public defenders for the 
entire country. They are underpaid and completely swamped with 
gigantic caseloads. 
In some instances, judges may and do appoint private lawyers 
to defend indigents, but often the lawyer is diverted from the 
task by his own private practice and neglects p r ~  bone cases. 
Court dates are missed, and the accused remains in jail, Another 
lawyer maybe appointed or the judgemay simply decide the case 
on what is in the file, Though the codes of ethics of the bar 
associations often impose an obligation to represent indigents, 
this is not commonly enforced. 
The only other source of legal assistance is programs within 
the law faculties of some of the region's universities. These 
are of limited reach and concentrate mainly on civil and family 
disputes rather than criminal cases, although some are now 
beginning to focus toward student representation of criminal 
defendants  under t h e  s u p e r v i s i o n  of a  law f a c u l t y  member o r  o t h e r  
member of t h e  bar. 
I t  is  t h u s  no t  uncommon f o r  a  defendant  t o  be  unrepresented 
by counse l  throughout t h e  j u d i c i a l  process.  The a b s o l u t e  r i g h t  
t o  counse l  has  no t  been l e g a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  region. The 
p u b l i c  defender  a r e a  is  one of  extreme and obvious  need. 
Honduras, f o r  example, ha s  i d e n t i f i e d  it a s  a  p r i o r i t y  and asked 
f o r  funds  t o  a c t i v a t e  i t s  1980 l e g i s l a t i o n  and o rgan ize  a  
func t ion ing  p u b l i c  defender system. The law f a c u l t y  a t  t h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  of Panama is a l s o  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  deve lop ing  t h i s  area .  
Bar Assoc i a t i ons  ------ 
Bar a s s o c i a t i o n s  (Coleg ios  d e  abogados) have been s l o w l y  
e v o l v i n g  i n  t h e  region from s o c i a l  groups p rov id ing  b e n e f i t s  t o  
members toward g r e a t e r  p u b l i c  i s s u e  involvement.  I n  some cases ,  
t h e r e  have been r i v a l  lawyers  groups,  u s u a l l y  hav ing  a p a r t i c u l a r  
p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n .  The concept of a  compulsory i n t e g r a t e d  
bar  is  of r e c e n t  o r i g i n  i n  most of t h e  region.  I t  e x i s t s  i n  
Costa Rica and Panama, and has  been ach ieved  r e c e n t l y  i n  t h e  
Dominican Republic. Honduras has  a s i n g l e  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  bu t  
membership i s  no t  compulsory and i ts  o n l y  r e sou rces  a r e  members' 
dues. E l  Sa lvador  has  f i v e  s e p a r a t e  and h i g h l y  p o l i t i c i z e d  
a s s o c i a t i o n s .  
While bar  a s s o c i a t i o n s  have no t  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  p layed  a  
s t r o n g  r o l e  i n  s u p p o r t  o f t h e  j u d i c i a r y o r  a s  p r e s s u r e  g r o u p s  f o r  
law reform, t h a t  is changing i n  p o s i t i v e  ways. 
The Dominican Republ ic  is a  c a s e  i n  point .  I n  t h e  two y e a r s  
s i n c e  passage of  t h e  law making membership i n  a  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e g r a t e d  bar  mandatory, t h e  r e s u l t a n t  e n t i t y  has  e v o l v e d  
rapidly into a significant pressure group and is actively backing 
President Salvador Jorge Blancols efforts to enact a judicial 
civil service system. As part of the effort, the Dominican 
association has recently sponsored a National Congress on the 
Judiciary, which produced a detailed set of recommendations for 
achieving and assuring judicial independence. The Dominican bar 
has been a significant force in a recent nationwide judges1 
strike for higher pay and passage of the pending judicial career 
law. 
While less focused in their goals than the Dominicans, the 
Panamanian bar is now publicly demanding judicial reform. In 
Honduras, the bar association as yet is neither very active nor 
very strong. The Costa Rican bar association is the strongest in 
the region, but there, most of the basic reforms needed elsewhere 
have already been achieved. 
Indhenous Reform Efforts 
-- --- ---- ------ 
Central American judiciaries have been cognizant of many of 
the deficiencies demonstrated by their systems and have initiated 
reform efforts to correct them. Honduras has just enacted a 
major revision of its criminal code as a result of 
recommendations by a law reform commission. El Salvador has 
created two commissions to review legal codes and make 
recommendations on the administration of justice. The Dominican 
Republic established a review team which has suggested major 
reforms in the administrative structure of the judicial system. 
Finally, Costa Rica has continually reviewed its system of 
justice and maintains an on-going commission composed of 
principal actors from the legal community. 
Pa& U.S. &,l Assistance Efforts in Developing Countries 
T ~ a w  and Development 1 
Assistance to Third World nations1 legal systems is not a 
new concept and was once at the core of development ventures. 
Past efforts were embodied in the "law and development" program 
in Latin America. 
American legal assistance to developing countries began 
immediately after World War Two and reached its zenith during the 
late 1960's. All of these efforts flowed from notions of the 
superiority of the American legal model as the means of reaching 
a democratic solution to development in the emerging nations 
(Gardner, 1980). The approach became operational in Latin 
America in the mid-1960's with the introduction of legal 
education reform projects in Costa Rica, Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
, and Peru, under the auspices of the United States Agency for 
International Development and several American law professors. 
In Latin America, the U.S. law and development movement 
encountered an entrenched legal culture, peopled by a large and 
I 
powerful legal profession, trained in formalism and bound to 
European and national institutions. 
The major obstacle to the American model was the nature of 
Latin American legal education. Law instruction in Latin America 
dates back to 1553, centuries before American law schools 
appeared on the scene. Latin American law schools introduce law 
through a lecture system, during a five year period, immediately 
upon graduation from secondary studies. Their approach to law is 
comprehensive, placing emphasis on philosophy and history rather 
than the practical aspects of the profession, in sharp contrast 
to American legal education. American legal scholars, working in 
the law and development effort, attempted to shift the emphasis 
from this lecture method to Socratic principles and case studies, 
so prevalent in American law schools, with very little success. 
By the beginning of the 70's the optimistic projections of the 
innovators were reevaluated, and they tended to move away from 
basic reform of legal education to practical applications aimed 
at utilizing existing structures. In Costa Rica, for example, a 
comprehensive indexing system for existing legislative materials 
was introduced (Wroe, 1973). 
Although it is difficult to summarize the basic flaws in the 
American development effort in a few words, the following may be 
pointed out: 
1. Most, if not all of these effortswere conceived and 
planned in the United States, and not in the receiving countries. 
As such, many of these efforts were ethnocentric, developed by 
I 
American lawyers who combined an almost religious belief in the 
certainty and transportability of the American legal model with 
only limited information and experience of the receiving 
countries. 
2. Most projects were overly ambitious in their expectation 
I that changes in the legal systems would translate into instant 
democratic models. 
3. Perhaps the most basic flaw of these programs is that 
they sought to change institutions and principles which were at 
the cultural core of the societies which they were seeking to 
19 
alter, 
4. The programs were often based on erroneous information, 
primarily resulting from the lack of empirical data available on 
the operation of the legal system. 
5, They mistook the willingness of Latin Americans to 
receive funding for a willingness to accept the principles being 
exported. 
